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Surprising Commons
Carol M. Rose*
Let me begin this article on “surprising commons” with a few
words about another article that I wrote some years ago, in the mid1980s. It was called The Comedy of the Commons, and in it, I tried to
figure out a peculiar and very long-standing legal pattern in which
some kinds of terrain systematically resist privatization and instead
remain in a state of more or less open access. 1 It is not a large
category, but what makes this kind of territory interesting is that it
has a legal land use profile that is quite different from the ordinary
pattern for land. Land normally can become private property and
indeed is generally expected to turn into private property, with some
exceptions for property owned by governmental entities—and even
the latter category is unlikely to be held in a condition of complete
open access.
I suspect that The Comedy of the Commons is the reason that I am
here today, as a figure something like “The Old Lady of the
Commons.” The article did create a minor flurry at the time it came
out, though certainly not as much as I would have liked. Of course,
academics always would like more fuss about their work than the
work actually gets, but with this one in particular, I had hoped for
more attention in what was then a voluminous literature about the
“public trust” in natural resources. I thought to myself for a while
that I should have put the words “public trust” in the title, but then
I more or less forgot about the whole thing and went on to other
petty grievances about later articles that in my opinion were
dreadfully under-cited.
But then, to my amazement, The Comedy of the Commons turned
out to have a second life fifteen or twenty years later, thanks to some

* Ashby Lohse Professor of Water and Natural Resource Law, University of Arizona Rogers
College of Law, and Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor of Law and Organization (emer.),
Yale Law School. I would like to thank the organizers of this symposium for all the work they
have done to get us all here and talking to one another, particularly Brigham Daniels, who did
so much to bring us all here, as well as Nicole Sofe, who has made all the logistics so smooth.
1. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).
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unknown person who told Larry Lessig to have a look at it. Larry
Lessig and Yochai Benkler are among our main gurus of the idea of
an open Internet, and the two of them, to my great delight, thought
that my Comedy was just the ponderous citation they needed to show
what is positive and helpful about open access. 2 Thanks to them, I
have gotten a second chance to dine out on that old article, as a
friend of mine puts it; and indeed, the dining is even better in the
second round. 3
And so, what happened to The Comedy of the Commons was
definitely a pleasant surprise. But that is not actually the surprise that
I want to talk about now. What I want to talk about is the more
general phenomenon of surprises in real resources that are called
“commons” or “commonses.” Hence the title, Surprising Commons:
the commons can surprise you.
In one sense, one thing that should be a surprise is the fact that
we have a phrase like “the commons” at all. For this we have to
thank Garrett Hardin, whose famous essay tacked the fateful word
“tragedy” onto the commons. 4 For all the problems in Hardin’s
essay, it did usher in an importantly catchy phrase, and it induced
many other scholars to think systematically about what happens to
resources that are open to all. But Garrett Hardin’s famous Tragedy
of the Commons did not treat the fate of the commons as at all
surprising and neither did other natural resource economists whose
work preceded Hardin’s. Before Hardin’s famous essay, Scott
Gordon had written an analysis that was quite similar, although more
technical, with a dreadful name: The Economic Theory of a CommonProperty Resource: The Fishery. 5 You can guess why Hardin, rather
than Gordon, became the iconic figure in this line of thinking. But
Gordon was like Hardin in thinking that the decimation of openaccess resources was to be expected. For both, the whole point was
to analyze the reasons why commons tragedies are the way things

2. Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Sharable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a
Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 296 n.77 (2004); Lawrence Lessig,
Recrafting a Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 56, 64 (2006).
3. The latest gratifying citation arrived with JEREMY RIFKIN, THE ZERO MARGINAL
COST SOCIETY: THE INTERNET OF THINGS, THE COLLABORATIVE COMMONS, AND THE
ECLIPSE OF CAPITALISM 157–58 (2014) (making much of this old article).
4. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
5. H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery,
62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954).
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are, at least in the absence of consciously chosen constraints, rather
than to question whether the commons might come out some
other way.
Why did these scholars see commons tragedies as simply the
nature of things? One way to look at this is simply as a description.
Look around and you will see that people overuse things that are
freely available or they free ride on the work of others when it is
possible. As a result, at least with respect to physical resources, we
decimate grasslands, we overfish open fisheries, we chop down
forests, and we pour junk into the air and the water. That is Hardin’s
description, and it is at least recognizable. With respect to
intellectual resources, there is nothing physical to destroy, but we
take a free ride on the ideas and efforts of others, and in so doing we
undermine creativity by making it harder for originators to capitalize
on their own creativity.
The more interesting way to look at these issues is not simply
descriptive, but analytic. Commons issues can be analyzed as
collective action problems, which themselves are multi-person
versions of the “prisoners’ dilemma” (PD) 6—a scenario in which the
best collective payoff occurs if the actors cooperate, but in which the
actors’ individual motivations drive against cooperation. While
people do in fact reach cooperative solutions, a point to which I will
return later, those solutions ultimately depend on moments of
generosity or trust that are out of line with conventional rational
actors’ behavior—what Jon Elster has called a “magical” belief that
others will reciprocate one’s cooperative actions. 7 But there is no
reason to expect that magic to occur, either in PDs or in the multiperson commons.
According to these theorists of the commons, then, there is logic
behind our rationale of selfish behavior, even if it is ultimately
ruinous to the common resource. We behave as we do not because
we are evil, but because we have every reason to believe that others
behave in this way. Our own behavior is not even simply a matter of
playing copycat; it rather derives from a realistic reckoning of the
situation, a kind of rational response. If we go lightly and conserve

6. For a discussion of the dominance of the prisoners’ dilemma among game theory
stories, see Carol Rose, Game Stories, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 369, 382–91 (2010).
7. JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 5, 195–
201 (1989).

1259

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/8/2015 9:50 PM

2014

resources, will those resources be saved? Will we have teeming
fisheries, intact forests, clean air and water? No. All that will happen
is that we fall behind those who are not conserving resources; they
will take what we have not taken, and our abstemiousness will just
hurt us and do nothing for the resources that others squander in our
stead. The tragic part of the tragedy of the commons is that even
people who would like to do better do not think they can
change things.
In short, according to this well-known and lugubrious caricature,
commons tragedies are built into the nature of collective action.
They should not be a surprise to anyone.
But in fact, commons tragedies are a surprise. We have one
example after another of how astonished people are by commons
problems, including commons problems that degrade physical
resources, which one would think we would notice. We are
surprised, first, that we have a commons problem at all, and second,
that the problem has something to do with open access to resources.
Let me give some examples. In 1883, sportsmen from the
eastern United States got themselves outfitted and came out on the
new railroads to the western plains, hoping to repeat the grand bison
slaughter of the previous years. 8 After all, they had seen or heard
about the bison herds—unimaginably large, an inexhaustible tide of
animals. And what did the hunters find? An empty, silent plain. We
all know what had happened: the bison had been hunted practically
to extinction. The great herds were gone. The newly outfitted
hunters had not even realized that there could be a problem about
bison because there had been so many.
Fifty-plus years later, in the early 1940s, citizens of Los Angeles
found that their valley was filled with an acrid, fumy smog. They
thought it must be coming from a wartime synthetic-rubber plant,
which they proceeded to shut down. 9 Then they were surprised to
find that, no, it was not the synthetic-rubber plant after all, because
nothing changed. The cause was their own cars and trucks. What?
Impossible! It cannot be us, with our little-bitty cars and trucks. But
it was. They knew they had a problem, but they did not realize that
8. JAMES A. TOBER, WHO OWNS THE WILDLIFE? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
CONSERVATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 100–102 (1981).
9. JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON
CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION, 1940–
1975, 52–54 (1977).
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it was a commons problem.
Forty years later, from about 1980 onward, just about everything
about climate change has been a surprise. The hole in the ozone
layer was the first major atmospheric event that people noticed
widely, thanks to satellite observations. 10 Oh my goodness, there is a
hole in the ozone layer, and we are all going to fry! Or at least, we
are all going to have an elevated risk of skin cancer. As one of my
friends said, he was raised to think that the atomic bomb would
destroy the earth, but it turns out that the culprit will be aerosol
underarm deodorant. Who knew?
A little later, it was, oh my goodness, the polar ice caps are
melting. 11 Who knew? Now the culprit turns out to be our own coalfired electricity plants and our own trucks and autos, along with
everything else that produces carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases—and that is a lot of things. And more recently, here is one of
the latest surprises: jellyfish are taking over the oceans. 12 There are so
many jellyfish that one Japanese fishing vessel capsized when trying
to pull up a net that the fishers thought was full of fish. It was not. It
was full of jellies, and they were far too heavy for the boat to
manage. Unlike other fish, jellies can live in severely de-oxygenated
water, so they do not mind pollution, and they don’t mind it if the
other fish have died off and are not around to eat their larvae either.
And speaking of jellies’ larvae, those little things just love to breed
on the hard plastic surfaces of junk that sticks in the craw of other
fish and tangles up waterfowl and drowns them. 13 Not that the jellies
need the plastic in order to breed—they apparently can breed in
profusion just about anywhere. They do breed just about
everywhere, too, because they get sucked up into the ballast water of
ocean-going vessels and then hitch rides all over the watery world.
Some of Australia’s most deadly and poisonous jellies are starting to
show up in the waters off Florida. 14 Presumably some may say that
10. See OZONE HOLE, http://www.theozonehole.com/ozoneholehistory.htm (last
visited Feb. 12, 2014) (brief history of ozone depletion and its discovery).
11. See Justin Gillis & Kenneth Chang, Scientists Warn of Rising Ocean from Polar Melt,
N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2014, at A1 (describing early warnings of sea rise due to ice cap melt).
12. Tim Flannery, They’re Taking Over!, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Sept. 26, 2013),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/sep/26/jellyfish-theyre-takingover/?pagination =false&printpage=true (reviewing LISA-ANN GERSHWIN, STUNG!: ON
JELLYFISH BLOOMS AND THE FUTURE OF THE OCEAN (2013)).
13. See id.
14. See id.
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the current superabundance of jellies is just a natural variation, but
one cannot help but wonder about this, given their prodigious
hardiness amidst human overuse of the ocean commons—that is, our
taking far too much out in the case of other fish stocks, and in the
case of pollutants, putting far too much in.
Anyone could think of more examples, but just for that reason,
we should all be expecting the nasty outcomes that we get from
uncontrolled commons situations. But instead, those nasty outcomes
all too often seem to take us by surprise—even the physical
problems, the ones that we ought to be able to see with our eyes.
A parenthesis here: all the items that I have mentioned so far
come from what political scientist and Nobel Prize winner Elinor
Ostrom called “open access” and not what she considered the true
“commons.” 15 What she meant by commons is a more traditional
understanding, one that long predates Hardin’s usage: a limited
common resource that benefits a particular community of users and
that is governed by that same community. For now, I am going to
stick with the commons as open access—the Hardin version of the
commons rather than the Ostrom version. I will take up the Ostrom
version a little later, particularly to show some ways that the Ostrom
limited commons can be useful for solving some of the surprises
lurking in Hardin’s open-access commons.
With that, I want to turn to the reasons why commons problems
surprise us.
I. WHY THE SURPRISE?
Perhaps the most ordinary source of surprise about commons
problems is a characteristic that is shared by most commons: each
commons problem is an accumulation of small events over time,
none of which seems very significant at the time. The smog in the
Los Angeles basin is an example: there and elsewhere smog is caused
by the combustion of thousands and then millions of autos and
trucks, each emitting what are actually quite small amounts of the
gases that are transformed into smog by sunlight. No wonder people
were surprised. How could such small leakages be responsible for the
miserable air quality throughout the huge Los Angeles basin?
Carbon-caused climate issues have a similar pattern. A great
15. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
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number of things emit carbon dioxide, but so what? It is not
poisonous, indeed the plants need it to grow, and we need the plants
in order to survive. Besides, the air mantel is huge and the oceans
absorb a lot of carbon dioxide, as do all those plants. So, what could
be the problem if another new factory starts burning fossil fuels? And
those jellyfish blooms and fish die-offs are similar: sure, we dump a
lot of junk and gunk into the rivers, and the rivers flow into the
oceans, but the oceans are massive. So how could that stuff really
have an effect on aquatic life? Who could see all this coming?
This, then, is one major reason why commons problems are
surprising: so many of them arise from an accumulation of relatively
small-scale events, none of which seems very significant
taken alone. 16
Another and closely related source of surprise is what one might
call the “unexpected environmental byproduct effect.” The effect
emerges when efforts that are taken for one purpose and one set of
reasons generate unexpected consequences in some unnoticed or
unpredicted environmental realm. Take, for example, roadways that
are constructed in rainforest areas. The roads are built in order to
help people get in and out of these remote areas, so that they can
settle there, get around, and get to market. Settlement obviously has
foreseeable effects on the rainforest; settlers are almost certainly
going to cut down some trees. But the roads themselves have
consequences: they allow sunlight to enter, the sunlight dries out the
vegetation, and dried-out vegetation catches fire easily or permits
erosion. Meanwhile, the roads provide corridors for invasive plant
and animal species, while they block the crossing movements of
native species. 17
Another example comes from the early years of the twentieth
century: researchers found that lead additives in gasoline could
enhance the performance of motor vehicles, particularly by reducing
engine knock. But the lead additives vaporized into the air. Then

16. See also Bonnie J. McCay, Emergence of Institutions for the Commons: Contexts,
Situations, and Events, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 361, 365–69 (Elinor Ostrom et al.
eds., 2002) (noting the lack of knowledge of commons depletion and the lack of attribution to
human causes).
17. Carol M. Rose, Big Roads, Big Rights: Varieties of Public Infrastructure and Their
Impact on Environmental Resources, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 409, 420 (2008); Robert L. Fischman,
From Words to Action: The Impact and Legal Status of the 2006 National Wildlife Refuge System
Management Policies, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 77, 84 n.24 (2007).
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kids who breathed the vapors in the air got lead into their
bloodstreams and suffered from impaired nervous system
development. 18 Certainly none of this happened on purpose; it was
an unexpected byproduct of an effort made for other purposes
entirely. In a similar example, I have read recently that some
subscribe to a theory that the active ingredient in some herbicides
could cause various ailments, including autism. 19 The theory is that
herbicide residues remain on food, and when ingested they kill
microbes in the human digestive tract—microbes that normally
control other bodily functions, including brain functions. This all
sounds rather far-fetched, a kind of biological Rube Goldberg
machine, but a pathway of that sort would be akin to other
commons byproducts: some unexpected environmental effect that
comes from an effort to do something else altogether.
Technology is a major source for commons problems of this sort,
that is, the unexpected consequences that emerge in some domain
entirely different from the aim of the technology itself. No one
invented the automobile in order to pollute Los Angeles’s air; the
automobile was invented to get around the city more easily. No one
was aiming to kill birds when they built gleaming new skyscrapers.
Who knew that migrating birds would crash into them by
the millions? 20
Another generic reason for surprise is also related to technology,
but here technological advances reveal information right away—
about unanticipated subjects. Technological developments
sometimes thrust commons issues into the world’s attention, even
while the technologists were trying to do something else altogether.
All of a sudden, we can see a number of things that we did not
notice before at all, and we are surprised. The most obvious example

18. Carol M. Rose, Scientific Innovation and Environmental Protection: Some Ethical
Considerations, 32 ENVTL. L. 755, 762–63 (2002).
19. See, e.g., David Gumpert, It’s Everywhere: MIT Scientist Presents Dire Portrait of
Damage from Monsanto’s Roundup, THE COMPLETE PATIENT (June 8, 2014),
http://thecompletepatient.com/article/2014/june/9/its-everywhere-mit-scientist-presentsdire-portrait-damage-monsantos-roundup (last visited Jan. 24, 2015) (reporting on lectures by
MIT research scientist Stephanie Seneff).
20. The number of bird collisions with glass in buildings of all sorts has been estimated
to come close to one billion (2014 estimate), as compared to about 600,000 for wind towers
(2013 estimate). See Birds and Collisions, AMERICAN BIRD CONSERVANCY,
http://www.abcbirds.org/abcprograms/policy/collisions/index.html
(last
visited
Jan. 24, 2014).
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is satellite technology, which has enabled scientists to see the hole in
the ozone layer, and which now permits observers to see the fires in
tropical rainforests. 21 Those issues were not the reasons for satellite
technology at all; it was aimed at other things, like military
intelligence, telecommunications, and conventional weather
forecasting. But satellite technology has allowed us to see other
things too, quite unexpectedly.
Another source of surprise about commons problems has to do
not with the simple non-observance of commons problems, but
rather with the refusal to see them. It is a rare person who wants to
believe that her activities might cause bad things, especially when
those activities are economically important. Thus, fishers have
persistently denied that fish populations are affected by their fishing;
they say the scientists are ignoramuses who know nothing about
fish. 22 Farmers worldwide ignore the effect that pesticides can have
on bird populations, not to speak of their own health. 23 Defenders of
carbon emitters say that climate change is a fraud, or that it is
unrelated to human activities. 24 Over time, some of these refusals
have given way to contrary facts. At least some fishers have gotten on
board with effective conservation measures like no-fishing zones or
cap-and-trade in fisheries, 25 and farmers have generally adopted less
toxic pesticides, although perhaps not as environmentally friendly as

21. See
Ozone
Hole
over
Antarctica,
VISIBLE
EARTH,
http://visibleearth.nasa.gov/view.php?id=476 (last visited Mar. 21, 2015) (showing early
satellite images of ozone hole); Rebecca Lindsey, From Forest to Field: How Fire is
OBSERVATORY
(June
8,
2004),
Transforming
the
Amazon,
EARTH
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/AmazonFire/ (showing inter alia satellite
images of forest burns).
22. See DAVID DOBBS, THE GREAT GULF: FISHERMEN, SCIENTISTS, AND THE
STRUGGLE TO REVIVE THE WORLD’S GREATEST FISHERY (2000); James William Merrill,
Trawling for Meaning: A New Standard for “Best Scientific Information Available” in the
Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation Act, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 475–79 (2011), and
sources cited therein.
23. See, e.g., Farmers Not Heeding Pesticide Warnings, IRIN NEWS (Sept. 10, 2012),
http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=96223; Helen Thompson, Popular
Pesticides Linked to Drops in Bird Populations, SMITHSONIAN.COM (July 10, 2014),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/popular-pesticides-linked-drops-birdpopulation-180951971/?no-ist.
24. See STEVE GOREHAM, THE MAD, MAD, MAD WORLD OF CLIMATISM: MANKIND
AND CLIMATE CHANGE MANIA (2012).
25. See Jonathan H. Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Learning How to Fish: Catch Shares and
the Future of Fishery Conservation, 31 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 150, 190 (2013).
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had been hoped. 26 Even some climate change scoffers have
moderated their positions, though not all by any means. 27
Outright denial of commons problems is one reason to ignore
these issues, but another reason to ignore them is that they may not
seem to matter—at least until they turn into surprises. A major factor
here is human ingenuity. When things get scarce, human beings are
likely to find workarounds: better ways to produce the scarce things,
better ways to use less of them, or substitutes that do almost as well
(or in some cases better). Decades ago, the economist Julian Simon
made a bet with biologist Paul Ehrlich when Ehrlich argued that
humans were on the high road to running out of the earth’s natural
resources. Simon bet that humans would do no such thing, and the
proof was to be that a basket of specified resources would not
increase in price (adjusted for inflation) over a period of ten years.
Simon won the bet hands down. 28
However, there is a catch: Simon and Ehrlich made their bet not
on common resources, but rather on resources that normally belong
to some person or entity—commodities, including tin, nickel, and so
on. With resources of that sort, someone owns the mine and
someone else owns the refining plant, and they have good reason to
pay attention as the resource becomes scarcer. With goods that are
owned, increasing scarcity shows up pretty quickly in higher prices of
the resource, and higher prices incentivize the human ingenuity that
produces the workarounds of conservation and substitutes.
Unfortunately, open-access common resources have a different
profile. No one has to pay for the common resource itself, so these
resource scarcities produce no price signals. 29 The only prices that
come into anyone’s calculations are the prices of extraction itself—

26. See Thompson, supra note 23 (describing move away from DDT to what was
thought to be safer pesticide).
27. See, e.g., Anthony Adragna, Ryan Acknowledges Human Involvement but Says Climate
Change Science Unsettled, 45 ENVTL. REP. 2989 (Oct. 17, 2014) (describing Representative Paul
Ryan’s shift in position on climate change, conceding human role though little else); Bjorn
Lomborg, Climate Change Misdirection, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2013, 7:05 PM), http://o
nline.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323485704578258172660564886
(same
for
former skeptic).
28. See PAUL SABIN, THE BET: PAUL EHRLICH, JULIAN SIMON, AND OUR GAMBLE
OVER EARTH’S FUTURE 181–89 (2013) (describing Simon’s victory but also some ambiguities
about it).
29. Carol M. Rose, Property and Emerging Environmental Issues—The Optimists vs. the
Pessimists, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 405, 408–11 (2012).
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things like boats and equipment and the costs in time of chasing
increasingly scarce goods—so that no one will stop until the good is
so scarce that extraction itself is not worth the expenditure of effort
and equipment. By this time, the resource itself is likely to be a mere
remnant, and the former extractors, who have never invested in a
workaround that conserves the common but now remnant resource,
simply turn to some other resource.
And so do consumers. Simon and Ehrlich’s erstwhile consumers
of tin and nickel are still consuming tin and nickel. Higher resource
prices sent a signal about those commodities and made it worthwhile
to figure out conservation and substitutes early on, so that nickel and
tin are still available. But consumers of wild fish are not consuming
Orange Roughy anymore, because that stock is close to extinction. 30
Instead, they are eating some other species of wild fish, and they do
not feel in their pocketbooks the cost of the new fish stock’s
depletion either. No one does, because the new species is up for
grabs—just like Orange Roughy once was.
I have exaggerated here, because in fact, the very serious
depletion of wild fish stocks has induced some governments to
institute a number of conservation efforts, nowhere more than in
New Zealand, to whose fishermen the Orange Roughy’s depletion
was once a surprise. But it is not a surprise anymore, and New
Zealand now has an extremely active fisheries management system. 31
On the other hand, many wild fish stocks continue to be overfished
because they are still in a condition of open access, where the tragedy
of the commons plays out to its doleful finish. 32 The crashes of these
stocks may not seem to matter as long as fishers can turn to some
other species. One can only hope that fishers figure out a way to
make jellyfish into an attractive kind of seafood.
These, then, are some of the sources of surprise about commons
tragedies: the reasons why we ignore what is happening to some
common resource until its crash surprises us—or, if we are lucky, some
new information source, prior to a crash, reveals the problem we were

30. See John Charles Kunich, Losing Nemo: The Mass Extinction Now Facing the World’s
Ocean Hotspots, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 13 n.32, 31–32, 32 n.125 (2005).
31. See Kirsten M. Batkin, New Zealand’s Quota Management System: A Solution to the
United States’ Federal Fisheries Management Crisis?, 36 NAT. RES. J. 855, 866–70 (1996).
32. See, e.g., Eric A. Bilsky, Conserving Marine Wildlife Through World Trade Law, 30
MICH. J. INT’L L. 599, 601–604 (2009) (attributing worldwide “peril” in wild fish stocks
to overfishing).
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blithely ignoring. There is a sort of generic reason behind all these
reasons for ignoring commons problems, and this generic reason sets
the background for our surprise when things go awry or the well runs
dry unexpectedly.
Open access means that no one has the right to exclude—that is,
there are no property rights in the common resource that vest in any
particular person, entity, or group. But if that is the case, there also is
no way to make much money or to take other gains from conserving
or investing in the open-access resource. But there is a further
consequence for information: if there is no way to make gains from
something, we tend not to bother to find out much about it. 33
The possibility for economic gain is a huge driver of information
collection and investigation. But where that possibility is missing,
investigation is much less intense. And so, we get lots of information
about the ways to catch fish, including the technology for catching
them, but not so much (until relatively recently) about the larger
stocks from which individual fish come. To be sure, sheer curiosity
and perhaps affection can lead people to invest in information about
some unowned things, for example birds, which fascinate
many people.
But in the meantime, a great deal of information gathering goes
into activities that do make gains, even if, or maybe especially if,
those activities can use open-access resources without paying for
them. I mentioned lead additives earlier; these are an example of the
information aspect of commons problems. Back in the 1920s, there
was considerable research and development to make lead additives
that would enhance automobile engine performance. There was even
some research about the direct effects of lead on those who worked
with lead additives, especially when the workers started to behave
oddly. But there was very little research about the damage that
vaporized lead in air might do, especially to children’s mental
acuity. 34 Generally speaking, these lapses are not anyone’s fault. The
problem is just that open access in physical resources—like ambient
air—not only tends to leave the resource open to dissipation; open
33. See Rose, supra note 18, at 758–66 (discussing the relationship between property
and information); cf. Jason Scott Johnston, The Rule of Capture and the Economic Dynamics of
Natural Resource Use and Survival Under Open Access Management Regimes, 35 ENVTL. L.
855, 876 (2005) (noting that information about open-access resources is a public good, whose
provision depends on politics).
34. See Rose, supra note 18, at 762–63, and sources cited therein.
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access also dissipates the investment in getting information about
the resource.
The absence of property rights, then, is a kind of generic reason
for surprise about the decimation of commons resources. No
property means no chances for gain—a scenario that sets the stage
for simply ignoring open-access resources, and then, of course,
being surprised at their degradation.
I do not want to leave the topic of sources of surprise about the
commons—the Hardin variety, that is—without mentioning what
Dan Farber has called probabilities behaving badly. 35 Farber is
interested in the kinds of nonlinear sequences of interactions that one
sees in fractal geometry. These ill-behaved probabilities occur when
some combination of seemingly minor events lead to major follow-on
events and sometimes disaster scenarios. The classic hypothetical is
something like the butterfly that flaps its wings somewhere in the
tropics and sets in motion a train of events that ends up with a
hurricane that strikes Cape Cod. As of now, we cannot foresee these
events except in broad generalities on the one hand, or very shortterm predictions on the other. In the broad generality category, we
know that we are very likely to have hurricanes in certain seasons in
certain general locations; we know too that earthquakes are bound to
happen at some time in some locations. Alternatively, in the very short
term, we know that a tornado is forming this afternoon near a midsized city in Kansas. We just do not know much in the middle ground
between the long-term generality and the very short-term actuality.
But we do see the aftermaths, such as the results of wildly
disproportionate weather events in the news. In November 2013, it
was the terrible photographs of dazed people walking in the
wreckage of the Philippine city of Tacloban after Typhoon Haiyan.
Several years back, it was the equally terrible pictures of people
thrown together in the Superdome in New Orleans after Hurricane
Katrina. These exceedingly unpleasant surprises are different from
the other commons surprises, where we ourselves have been blithely
re-enacting the tragedy of the commons without paying attention,
and then we suddenly realize we have a problem. With probabilities
behaving badly, we are the ones who are suddenly thrust into a
commons, a kind of commons of nature where all kinds of events

35. Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly:
Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145 (2003).
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enter and build on one another without restraint. The surprise is not
that we have devastated a commons, but that this commons has
devastated us.
But to finish this section on a cheerier note, in a very limited
class of physical resources, surprises from open access are not
unpleasant and difficult, but rather fortuitous and happy. This was
the topic of my old article, The Comedy of the Commons. Roads,
waterways, other transportation and communication lanes and areas,
possibly even recreational areas and pleasure grounds—all can create
pleasant surprises in a state of open access. At least within the limits
of capacity and overcrowding, more is better: more trade, more
commerce, more network effects, more scale economies, more
conversations, more fellow feeling, more people at the party. 36 As I
said at the outset, this article about a “comic” commons began with
the locations needed for travel and communication, but it enjoyed a
second life in connection with intellectual resources, so at this point
I would like to turn to those.
II. INTELLECTUAL RESOURCES AND THE SURPRISES FROM THE
COMMONS
In the realm of physical resources, the surprises of open access
are very likely to be unpleasant, with the important but limited
exceptions of communication lanes and common gathering spaces.
All of us can recall the arguments for property rights in physical
resources. As opposed to open access, propertization is said to avoid
the destruction of resources in wasteful practices and conflicts.
Instead, property encourages investment and curtails free riding,
allowing owners to reap what they sow; 37 moreover, by identifying
owners, property encourages trade and the movement of resources
to those who most value them. These arguments for property are, in
effect, warnings about the dangerous surprises that come from
leaving physical resources in open access.
But with intellectual resources, surprises from open access are
more ambiguous: some are unpleasant, but many more can be
positive, and some are a mixture. For intellectual resources, unlike
physical resources, there is no depletion or scarcity caused by
36. Rose, supra note 1.
37. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
4–9 (1766).
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multiple uses. Here, the whole case for property rests on the second
part of the property argument: encouraging investment—particularly
creative investment—by shutting off free riding and permitting trade
toward the highest-value users. But even with this thinner rationale
for property in intellectual matters, the case is ambiguous, because
open access in intellectual resources also creates surprises.
At least some of these surprises are positive rather than tragic.
Although I will have to limit my examples, because I am something
of an amateur in intellectual property (IP), there are some obvious
ones. As with physical resources, technology plays a major role in
creating access to intellectual resources. Everyone knows some
examples of the ways that technology has made knowledge more
accessible: one can start with the printing press, then add the
typewriter, then the copy machine, and then digital technology, to
mention just a few of the new technologies along the way. Medieval
musicians and troubadours depended on brain technology, i.e.,
memory, while the medieval learned professions depended on the
technology of handwriting. But when movable type printing arrived,
songs and poems and books became vastly more available, and this
new access encouraged education and then more technology as well.
That is the good part of the open access story. The bad part of
intellectual open access, at least arguably, was the invisible
discouragement that came from free riding—a discouragement that
may have undermined investment in creating the songs and poems
and pictures and machines in the first place, because others could copy
them and take some of the credit and the proceeds. 38 The industrial
revolution of the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries exemplified
this dilemma. England was a major source of new technology,
particularly the technology that assisted in the manufacture of textiles.
With their new inventions, English mills could create vastly more
textile products, at lower costs than the non-mechanized technologies.
Along the way, inventors got more ideas for further improvements to
machines for spinning, weaving, and other manufactures, as
innovation built on innovation. 39
38. See Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal
Conditions of the Emergence of the “Author”, 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDS. 425 (1984)
(discussing eighteenth-century German writers’ efforts to establish ownership via a cult
of “genius”).
39. DORON S. BEN-ATAR, TRADE SECRETS: INTELLECTUAL PIRACY AND THE ORIGINS
OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL POWER 10–12, 83–84 (2004).

1271

DO NOT DELETE

10/8/2015 9:50 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2014

But free riding was a constant threat to this burst of
technological inventiveness. I recently caught up with Doron BenAtar’s book about national industrial policy in that era, roughly the
turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century. Most nations’ basic
policy was simple: to get access to information about new inventions
coming from other countries while preventing similar information
from leaking out of their own borders. 40 The methods were crude.
We here in the United States had policies much like those of other
countries; we encouraged craftsmen and machinists to come here
with their technological knowledge, but at the same time we, like
others, did not permit the export of technological inventions
originating inside the country. 41
We have all seen the replication of this sequence in digital
technology. On the one hand, new copying technology has opened
up unprecedented access to intellectual products, along with an
explosion of new mixes and matches of ideas. But on the other hand,
arguments and legislation have followed, taking the position that
copying undermines creativity and investment in creative work. By
this time, though, it is not actually much of a surprise that this twostep has appeared.
Are there any surprises, then, in what might be thought to lead a
tragedy of the commons in intellectual resources? One such surprise
might be the lengths to which inventors and creators (or rather their
investors) will go to block open access to their creations. The most
recent major copyright legislation extends copyright protection to
what amounts to three generations, and it applies not only to new
works but to those that were already in existence at the time of the
act, and that would have come out of copyright earlier under the
laws in effect at the time of their creation. This of course makes
something of a mockery of the incentivizing rationale for the new
statute. 42 And then there is the technology that secures what is called
digital rights management (DRM), i.e., the technology that, among
other things, might make your electronic book disappear or that
might prevent you from copying it and passing it on. Technology of
this sort was obviously a challenge and a magnet for hackers, but
further technological defenses against hackers could be costly for the

40. Id. at 8–15.
41. Id. at 78–141.
42. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 248–49 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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manufacturers. And so, after DRM technology was invented,
legislation followed to make it illegal to circumvent DRM—
legislation that coincidentally may extend protection further than
copyright itself, for example, preventing people from “cheating” at
digital games. 43
There is certainly opposition to the privatization of intellectual
products through IP, but opposition to these privatization efforts has
typically been slow to develop and rather ineffective in a legislative
process historically dominated by insiders. 44 But then, another major
surprise is that proponents of open access have actually emerged and
have started to make themselves visible and audible. 45 Those
proponents include Larry Lessig and Yochai Benkler, who were
mentioned earlier, but also many others as well, including academics
like Mark Lemley, Amy Kapczynski, Jamie Boyle, and the whole
group
around
the
Creative
Commons
alternative
to
conventional copyright. 46
A third surprise has been the explosion of open-access activities
in the realm of intellectual efforts, ostensibly with no real payoff to
the players aside from interest and fun. Here we see the wild
proliferation of YouTube creations; the artists who now compose
new works made up of other peoples’ posted photos; the flash mobs
who organize through social media to sing Handel’s Messiah in food
courts—or to protest against dictatorial regimes the world over; and
of course the happy surprises of Wikipedia and Linux. The upshot of
all this is that open access in intellectual resources has created
surprises too. Some are unhappy, mimicking the free-riding
problems familiar in physical resources. But a number have been
happy, in a higher proportion than is the case with
physical resources.

43. Joseph P. Liu, Paracopyright—A Peculiar Right to Control Access, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 227, 229, 242–44 (Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014).
44. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 23, 70 (2006).
45. See, e.g., Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (arguing that extension of copyright act violated
incentivizing purpose).
46. Works by all these authors, except Amy Kapczynski, are cited in Anupam Chander &
Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1331 passim (2004);
for Kapczynski, see The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property
Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970 (2012). Chander and Sunder have some criticism of the
open-access idea, however, particularly as applied to less-developed areas and indigenous issues.
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III. THE PROSPECTS
At this point I would like to turn to the question of what comes
next. How can we avoid the unpleasant surprises of open-access
resources and keep the happy ones? Here I especially want to turn to
the late Elinor Ostrom’s version of the commons, the limited
commons, as a potential antidote to the “tragedy of the commons”
in Hardin’s account.
Ostrom famously complained that Hardin and his followers took
too narrow an approach to solving the problems of open access. She
complained that Hardin et al. proposed either individual property or
statist intervention as the only potential solutions to the problems of
open access. 47 Ostrom’s idea was that there is a third way,
exemplified in the practices of some communities. These
communities have continued for many years, even centuries, to hold
a set of critical resources—such as pastures, fisheries, or forests—in
common for insiders, while closing them to outsiders. In this way,
these communities have continued to enjoy the advantages of
common access, particularly the economies of scale that may
accompany multiple-participation; but they also incorporate the
manageability, conservation, and investment that accompany
exclusive property.
Meanwhile, there are a couple of surprises about limited commons
too. One surprise is the fact that we have limited commons regimes at
all. This is in itself a kind of pleasant development, but it is an
unexpected one.
Community-based regimes for governing common pool
resources are reenacting a kind of property too—it is just a groupbased property. And that is the surprise. James Krier long ago made
the point that if people fail to solve the commons problem at the
resource level, say, overgrazing or overfishing or polluting, then it is
a mystery how they solve it at the level of organizing a management
regime. 48 Just as commons issues at the resource level are problems
of collective action, organizing a management regime is another
collective-action problem. This would be the case whether the
management regime is based on public intervention, group-based
property, as in the case of limited commons, or even individual
47. OSTROM, supra note 15, at 12–14.
48. James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
325, 338 (1992).
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property. Issues of structure, membership, contribution, payoffs,
monitoring, and enforcement must all be addressed, and anyone
who has run a committee can attest to the hard work involved—and
to the temptation to shirk and free ride on the organizing efforts of
others. And so it is a surprise to find that we do in fact have limited
common property regimes, just as it is a surprise that we have any
other kinds of resource-management regimes, including
private property.
Some have been literally surprised to find such community-based
regimes. I heard Ostrom herself say many times that when Nepal’s
central government began a program of state-sponsored irrigation
works in the mid-twentieth century, the plans ignored the existing
irrigation works. But irrigation works were there. They were just not
the type that centralizing officials noticed. They were numerous,
small, do-it-yourself irrigation systems created and managed by local
farmers, and as it turned out, they generally out-performed the statesponsored works. 49
Ostrom’s Governing the Commons compiled information on
many regimes of this sort from all over the world, not only
irrigation systems, but also community-managed grazing areas,
fisheries, and forests. So did many other writings of the 1980s and
1990s. James Acheson described Maine’s “lobster gangs” and their
collective management practices for lobster fisheries; 50 Acheson,
together with Bonnie McCay, collected articles about a variety of
common property regimes from all corners of the globe for fishing,
grazing, and agriculture; 51 my Yale colleague Bob Ellickson wrote
his famous Order Without Law, 52 describing the very subtle norms
and social controls among ranchers of rural Shasta County,

49. Ostrom, writing with some other authors, mentioned this incident and its aftermath
in PAUL BENJAMIN ET AL., INSTITUTIONS, INCENTIVES, AND IRRIGATION IN NEPAL 29–30,
41 (1994), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnabt150.pdf; see also Elinor Ostrom
et al., Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, 284 SCIENCE 278, 280 (1999)
(citing the Nepal example to argue that because the norms that make local farmer-operated
irrigation systems function are “not visible” to “well-meaning donors,” the latter advocate the
replacement of “primitive” systems with governmentally directed technical projects that
reduce productivity).
50. JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988).
51. THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE AND ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL
RESOURCES (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987).
52. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991).
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California; Lisa Bernstein described the close community of
diamond merchants and their intricate practices governing trade
and dispute resolution. 53
These community-based property arrangements have had some
common characteristics. The first is that they limit access; not
everyone can have access, but generally only the community of
people contributing to maintenance. Second, transfer and movement
in and out of the regime are not easy, so that group membership—
and thus group know-how—is relatively stable. A third characteristic
is related: the rules and conventions of the group are likely to be very
complex, creating what scholars have called an anti-commons that
actually protects the commons by preventing easy entrance and exit.
A fourth characteristic is the reward system: aside from access to the
commonly managed resource, other rewards and punishments are
likely to be indirect, taking the form of prestige in the case of reward,
and neighborhood disapproval and even shunning in the case
of punishment.
For an example, take community-based irrigation systems: their
benefits are for the exclusive use of the community of contributors to
the ditch system, and not for outsiders. As to the insiders, the
contributing farmers keep an eye on one another; they complain and
gossip about those who take too much water or shirk on maintenance
of the ditches; they may select a particularly trusted and respected
person as the water master who decides allocation and responsibilities;
they may add another internal dispute resolution system, as in the case
of medieval Spanish irrigators. 54
Moreover, arrangements of this kind are not just about physical
resources; analogous patterns sometimes emerge in intellectual
property. Rob Merges has described groups of scientists who organize
themselves in similar ways, 55 as has Katherine Strandburg for surgeons’
organizations. 56 In these cases of intellectual resources, the members

53. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
54. OSTROM, supra note15, at 69–81; see also Bernstein, supra note 53, at 123–27
(describing dispute resolution in the diamond industry).
55. See Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific
Research, 13 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 145 (1996).
56. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Legal But Unacceptable: Pallin v. Singer and Physician
Patenting Norms, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS
OF IP 321 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014).
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of the group share information among themselves; they reserve special
prestige for major contributors; they reject outsiders who are not in
the know; and they decry and shun insiders who want to take their
achievements outside the system. All these practices encourage
contribution to the maintenance of what Strandburg calls groups
of “user-innovators.” 57
One might ask why members of these community-based
property regimes do not take the next step to individual property.
That is, why not have individual farms instead of common grazing;
patents and copyrights instead of professional exchanges? That this
step may not be taken is something of a surprise in itself, given the
volume of literature about the way that property rights supposedly
evolve from open access, through limited common property, to an
end-point of individual property. 58 But a number of limited common
property regimes have been quite stable over long periods of time.
Perhaps the classic examples are the irrigation systems of eastern
Spain mentioned above, which have been in continuous existence
since Muslim times. 59
Why do limited common property regimes resist
individualization? Some answers are now quite well known, and they
revolve around the advantages of limited commons regimes. By
comparison to completely individualized property, limited commons
permit the enjoyment of scale economies in all or part of a set of
economic activities, as in community irrigation systems, or, as Henry
Smith has illustrated, in the mixture of individual and common
elements in the very long-lasting medieval common fields regimes of
England. 60 Similarly, in the case of information-sharing innovator
groups, limited common organization permits network effects to
fertilize individual creativity. 61
Community-based property arrangements notoriously limit
57. Id. at 322.
58. See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of
the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1975) (describing property as evolving toward
individual property rights).
59. OSTROM, supra note 15, at 72–76, 95.
60. See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields,
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000).
61. See Strandburg, supra note 56; Merges, supra note 55; see also Amy Kapczynski,
Order Without Intellectual Property Law? A Case Study in Open Science (Nov. 11, 2014)
(unpublished paper) (on file with author) (describing an international network of
influenza scientists).
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entrance by outsiders, but limitations on outsider entry can be an
advantage for maintaining insider trust and group stability. Stability in
turn makes it possible to maintain complex resources without excessive
transaction costs. Thus, a stable user group can maintain a complicated
turn-taking system for fishing in a particular location, while a stable
theater troupe can manage all the aspects of setup and performance with
a minimum of re-education.
Another point is that group-based economic relationships may
spill over into other relationships. Community management can act
as a risk-sharing or insurance institution, as members help one
another out in times of uneven fortune. 62 Recreation and fun are also
often built into limited commons. All those spring festivals in the
country and conversations at the clubhouse create opportunities for
sociability and fun, while building solidarity in the group. 63
Those are the good parts of limited common property or
community management regimes. However, there are some deficits
as well. Limited common property regimes miss out on certain
aspects of modernist individual property, with its distinct boundaries
and easy transfer. Movement of goods to higher value users can be
impeded when insiders cannot sell to outsiders. The insiders,
meanwhile, can settle into patterns of hierarchical rigidity and
innovative sclerosis. 64 Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller, in their
article on the “liberal commons,” complained of a democratic deficit
in what Ostrom considered successful commons, 65 and Brigham
Daniels suggested that these kinds of limited commons regimes
might have a creativity deficit as well. 66
Moreover, it is not clear that either the democracy deficit or the
innovation deficit is curable in limited common property regimes.
The very patterns that hold these regimes together can stifle political
change, and they can stifle major innovation too; outsiders are not
welcome, and new ideas may not be welcome either. For example,
62. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1341–44 (1993).
63. See Rose, supra note 1, at 740–41, 758–59 (describing traditional protection of
recreational uses in customary law of the commons).
64. Carol M. Rose, Ostrom and the Lawyers: The Impact of Governing the Commons on
the American Legal Academy, 5 INT’L. J. COMMONS 28, 33–34 (2011).
65. Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549,
565–66 (2001).
66. Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENVTL. L. 515, 522
(2007) (arguing that commons institutions may favor stability over emerging values,
blocking change).
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there is a good deal of user innovation within the sphere of normal
science—and it is very valuable too, perhaps the chief source of
scientific advance. But major new ideas, outside the normal box, may
have to occur outside the ordinary group context. Dava Sobel’s
wonderful book, Longitude, gives an example: the cozy norms of
eighteenth century scientists rejected the clockmaker as a mere
tinker, but he was the one who solved the problem of longitude. 67
IV. CAN HARDIN AND OSTROM COMBINE?
Here it might be worthwhile to pause to consider whether there
are any new ways in which the Ostrom commons might get us
through some of the difficulties of the Hardin commons—that is,
new applications of the limited commons in the world of openaccess tragedies.
The short answer is a cautious “maybe”—and a very cautious one
with respect to physical resources. In recent years, there has been a
good deal of talk about ecosystem-based approaches, particularly in
watershed management. Watersheds of any significance are likely to
be too big for individual ownership, but too local to be managed by
a distant central government. Then too, watersheds are complicated
resource clusters. And finally, the goal of watershed management is
generally conservationist rather than development-oriented. Limited
commons approaches thus seem attractive, given their association
with multi-party, stable management of complex resources.
However, some problems loom, because it is not entirely clear
how we might deploy the Ostrom commons in ecosystem
management. Taking the central case of watersheds, the first
problem is the heterogeneity of what are called “stakeholders” in
these endeavors. In the modern watershed, unlike the medieval
common fields or the ancient irrigators of eastern Spain, residents
may include more urbanites along with rural types, and all are not
involved in a set of common economic enterprises; few may be
managing stock, and none taking part in a joint effort to cut turfs, as
they did in medieval times. In fact, in most modern watersheds,
some uses are likely to conflict with other uses. Rafters and fishers
conflict with each other, and both conflict with irrigators. A related
problem is that of devising a reward system for participation. The
67. DAVA SOBEL, LONGITUDE: THE TRUE STORY OF A LONE GENIUS WHO SOLVED
(1995).
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very heterogeneity of the group makes prestige a doubtful form of
payoff; farmers are unlikely to care much about high esteem from
rafters, and vice versa.
It may be, then, that with respect to heterogeneous physical
resources like ecosystems, management will often require something
more than the traditional characteristics of limited common property
regimes—perhaps something more akin to what Dagan and Heller
call the liberal commons, with opportunities for mutual education,
voting, horse trades, overt disagreement, and even exit, along with a
certain degree of external prodding from governmental entities.
With respect to intellectual ecosystems, the limited common
property model may adapt more readily, although it is unlikely to
look very traditional. Indeed, it is here that the limited version of the
commons can mix more easily with the open-access version. I have
become increasingly interested in volunteer systems of economic
organization, and in the current era, information gathering turns out
to generate quite a number of such systems. In various citizen
science projects, one can glimpse something like a mixture of
Hardin’s open-access commons and Ostrom’s community-managed
commons. In these projects, amateurs volunteer to measure
rainwater, count birds, keep calendars of flowering plants, and map
parts of the night sky, among many other things. One can discern
the mixture of Hardin and Ostrom in other domains too, as in the
crowd funding of small enterprises, and of course in the Linux
operating system and Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia.
What makes these mixed commons organizational models work?
Take rainwater measurement. First, modularity: the tasks are well
defined and doable in small portions, and the information to be
gathered is quite single-minded; it is just rain. Second, norms: the
participants are supposed to perform certain tasks, but these are
relatively focused and painless: just write it down every day, and fill
in this or that form on a computer screen. Third, fun: participants
like to do the work, and they are interested in seeing the compiled
results that come from the information provided by the whole group
of volunteers. Fourth, leadership: someone has to put all this
together and keep it running. It seems that many people are more
willing to follow than to lead; initiative is in much demand.
Fifth, and perhaps most interesting, is the factor of relaxed
boundaries. Participation in citizen science and other volunteer
enterprises is not confined to insiders, as with traditional irrigation
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systems, or diamond merchant groups, or even surgeons’ networks,
but rather is open to new members. Still, even with these porous
boundaries, some are participants and some are not. One interesting
comparison for participation might be with churches or other religious
organizations, where membership means something but is also open
to outsiders. Here too, Ostrom’s commons organization meets
Hardin’s open access commons.
On reflection, the same might be said of the features of Dagan
and Heller’s liberal commons, which have considerably more porous
boundaries and opportunities for movement than the traditional
limited commons. While the analysis of physical resources has
traditionally preceded the analysis of intellectual resources, for the
very good reason that physical resources can be perceived and
monitored more easily, one more surprise might be that modern
crowdsourcing enterprises can reverse the pattern. Intellectual
enterprises, rather than physical resources, might become the
location where we learn how to combine Hardin’s commons
with Ostrom’s.
V. ONE LAST SURPRISE—OR IS IT THE FIRST?
I would like to mention one other surprising element in dealing
with open-access resources, one that brings us back to the mysterious
aspects of commons solutions. This is a phenomenon that occurs in
the worst of all these surprises, the probabilities behaving badly,
when the disasters that we knew might come sometime do indeed
come and turn our world upside down.
Rebecca Solnit, in a book entitled A Paradise Built in Hell,
describes the temporary euphoria of people caught in these
surprises. 68 She elaborates on acts of astonishing generosity in
disasters like the San Francisco earthquake of 1906—of people
opening doors to houses and stores, giving away everything, working
day and night on rescue efforts. If people can remember these
terrible times later, they remember them as the most blissful days of
their lives.
It is not at all clear where this psychological state comes from. It
does not sound at all like the behavior of the classic rational actor. In
fact, it seems just the reverse: a temporary euphoria that entails
68. REBECCA SOLNIT, A PARADISE BUILT IN HELL: THE EXTRAORDINARY
COMMUNITIES THAT ARISE IN DISASTER (2009).
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forgetting rational calculation and immediate gains and losses as well
as long-term discount rates, and instead giving away everything right
now, right here.
But then, one may have to suppress the rational actor to break
through any kind of miserably unsolvable commons issue, to come
out to a happy surprise on the other side. What Solnit describes may
be an exaggerated and particularly intense version of the moment of
trust and risk-taking that enables human beings to break through any
kind of collective action issue, whether it is the small-scale prisoner’s
dilemma or the larger tragedy of the commons. We may not
understand this mysterious turn of mind at the foundation of
cooperative behavior, but we know that it happens, and much of our
social and political life depends on it—and our economic and
environmental life as well.
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